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"Medical care in America has become dangerously expensive."
Dr. Arnold S. Relman'
1 Introduction
The unprecedented growth of science and technology in the twenty-first
century has led to a world interconnected in a way that was once unimaginable.
Borders become nonexistent as individuals, societies, and economies connect
and melt together under the banner of globalization.2 For better or worse,
outsourcing has always been part of the globalization trend.3 For decades, U.S.
corporations have been reducing costs by outsourcing operations and
capitalizing on the abundance of natural and human resources in Asia.4 Today,
corporations are not the only ones seeking the cost savings of Asia. In 2005,
over 55,000 Americans traveled to Bunrungrad International Hospital in India
1. Dr. Arnold S. Relman, Foreword to MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND
MORALS, i, ix (1993).
2. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:
International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Strugglefor Peoples'Rights in Africa, 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 851, 885 (2003) (discussing the central features of globalization).
3. See, e.g., Aaron Judson Lodge, Globalization: Panacea for the World or
Conquistador of International Law and Statehood?, 7 OR. REV. INT'L L. 224, 267 (2005)
(discussing Sony's movement of its factory operations to Asia).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL BACKMAN & CHARLOTTE BUTLER, BIG IN ASIA: 25 STRATEGIES FOR
BUSINESS SUCCESS 36-37 (2003) (discussing outsourcing of labor to Asian countries as a tool
for increasing efficiency and cost savings for developing businesses).
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for surgeries, leaving the United States and trusting their bodies to foreign
doctors and surgeons. 5 At a time when approximately 42 million Americans do
not carry health insurance,6 many uninsured Americans are enticed by the
option of a surgical procedure that costs as little as one-tenth of the equivalent
surgery in the United States.7 The tens of thousands of dollars uninsured
Americans save via medical tourism have not gone unnoticed by the rest of the
U.S. health care industry. Private companies, health medical organizations, and
even states are exploring methods to utilize medical outsourcing to keep health
care costs in check. 8 Although medical outsourcing may appear on the surface
to be an attractive alternative to the out of control costs in the United States
health care system,9 the reality of endorsing medical outsourcing is much more
complex. This Note examines the interplay between the fiduciary duty imposed
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 197410 and
the cost savings available to private companies and health medical
organizations, and argues that such entities cannot offer plan participants
medical outsourcing without violating ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement.
Part II provides an overview of ERISA's scope and goals, focusing on the
fiduciary duty ERISA imposes upon plan administrators and which entities
within the health care system are subject to the fiduciary duty." The Part
concludes with an examination of the corollary duty of disclosure and the legal
remedies for plan participants when fiduciaries violate their duties under
ERISA. 2
5. See Arnold Milstein & Mark Smith, America's New Refugees-Seeking Affordable
Surgery Offshore, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1637, 1638 (2006) (providing statistics on the patients
treated at Bumrungrad International Hospital).
6. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2005 (Aug. 2006), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-23 1.pdf
(providing statistics detailing health insurance coverage in the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See infra tbl. 1 (comparing the cost of various surgical procedures abroad and in the
United States).
8. See infra Part III.C (discussing various attempts to standardize medical outsourcing as
an element of health care plans).
9. See Michael Klaus, Outsourcing Vital Operations: What if U.S. Health Care Costs
Drive Patients Overseas for Surgery?, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 231 (2006) (stating that
the United States spends $1.8 trillion on health care annually).
10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
11. See infra Part II.B-D (discussing the nature of ERISA's fiduciary duty and who
within the domestic health care system is subject to ERISA's duty).
12. See infra Part II.C (discussing the duty of disclosure within ERISA's fiduciary duty
and the legal remedies available for plan participants when fiduciary duties are breached).
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Part III examines the rise of medical tourism and the benefits and risks
associated with the practice. The Part discusses the legal risks associated with
medical tourism and the motivating factors that drive patients abroad for
medical services.' 3 Finally, Part III discusses attempts by companies, health
medical organizations, and states to utilize medical tourism via medical
outsourcing in their coverage plans.'
4
Part IV discusses whether medical outsourcing violates the fiduciary duty
imposed under ERISA in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
Part explores arguments both for and against ERISA liability and concludes
that although medical outsourcing does not result in a de jure violation of
ERISA's fiduciary duty, the financial incentives to both plan participants and
plan administrators create a situation resulting in a de facto violation of
ERISA's fiduciary duty. In conclusion, this Note suggests appropriate steps
Congress should take in order to ensure that the vision and purpose of ERISA
remain protected as health care evolves in a globalized society.
H. ERISA: An Overview
A. ERISA's Scope and Purpose
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197415 reflects the
government's belief that employee benefit and welfare plans play such an
important role in interstate commerce that these plans represent a national
public interest.' 6 Therefore, ERISA seeks to ensure the sound management and
application of employee benefit and welfare plans 17 via the establishment of
"minimum standards... assuring the equitable character of such plans and
their financial soundness."'18 These standards apply to both employee pension
plans and employee welfare benefit plans,' 9 which ERISA defines as including
13. See infra Part III.B (discussing the lack of legal remedies abroad for victims of
medical malpractice and the benefits associated with medical tourism that motivate patients to
seek care abroad).
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing recent attempts to integrate medical outsourcing into
health care plans).
15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of ERISA and
its goals).
17. See id. ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans... by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans.").
18. Id. (setting out the initial scope of ERISA).
19. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992)
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"medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits. ''20 In order to ensure uniformity,
ERISA provides that it "shall supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.",21 In determining
whether a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan, the Supreme Court
held that Congress intended the words "relate to" in their broadest sense and
rejected more limiting preemption language that would have made the clause
"applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by
ERISA.
, 22
Given the broad scope of ERISA's applicability, the threshold question for
evaluating any claim based on ERISA centers on whether a plan falls under
ERISA regulation. In making this determination, courts generally follow the
test delineated in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.23 In Fort Halifax, the
(stating that ERISA's regulations apply to both employee pension plans and welfare plans); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan"). 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) states:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund,
or program... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, [medical care or
benefits].
Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (listing the relevant services an employee welfare benefit plan
provides for its participants).
21. Id. § 1144(a) (describing ERISA's power to preempt state law relating to employee
benefit programs).
22. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (stating that Congress's
intent to create a broad preemption is clear in light of the "deliberately expansive" language
chosen by ERISA's drafters) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983)). But
see N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645,
658 (1995) (rejecting an overly expansive reading of the "relates to" language).
23. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,23 (1987) (holding that a Maine
severance pay statute was not preempted by ERISA because it did not relate to any employee
benefit plan). In Fort Halifax, the Supreme Court considered whether a Maine statute that
required employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a
plant closing was eligible for ERISA preemption. Id. at 3. Eleven employees of Fort Halifax
filed suit seeking severance pay under the Maine statute when their plant closed. Id. at 5. Fort
Halifax did not have its own severance plan and argued that ERISA preempted the state
requirement. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court found that the Maine statute was not preempted by
ERISA as the statute "neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee
welfare benefit 'plan' under [the] federal statute." Id. Further, the Court found the statute was
not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because it establishes a minimum labor
standard that does not intrude on the collective-bargaining process. Id. at 7. The language in
ERISA draws a distinction between "benefits" and "plans." Id. at 8. Finally, the preemption
clause role is to round out the protection afforded plan participants via the elimination of
conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulations in favor of a uniform approach. Id. at 9.
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Supreme Court defined an ERISA plan as one that requires an administrative
scheme for it to operate.24 Therefore, ERISA will govern a health plan when an
employer establishes an employee benefits plan that (1) requires an
administrative scheme and (2) provides the benefits described by ERISA.25
Once a plan meets the basic requirements for ERISA coverage, the next
relevant examination focuses on the fiduciary responsibility imposed by
ERISA.26
B. Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA
The ERISA guidelines that impose fiduciary27 duty requirements on a
variety of persons and organizations associated with employee welfare benefit
plans form the crux of the issue surrounding medical outsourcing.28 ERISA
provides a wide range of remedies for those injured by fiduciaries who
breached their duties,29 including repayment by the fiduciary of any losses
The Maine statute does not threaten the protection of plan participants and is not a plan, but
rather expands protection and offers a one-time benefit. Id. at 10. Therefore, the Maine statute
does not meet the necessary criteria for ERISA preemption. Id. at 23.
24. See id. at 12-19 (describing the various elements necessary to find an employee
benefit plan that would be eligible for ERISA preemption).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(B) (2006) (defining an employee welfare benefit plan as one
that pays the benefits described in either 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)(A) or 186(c)). A plan should
meet the statutory characteristics of an employee welfare plan before one examines the
administrative aspect of a plan. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court qualified
the coverage of ERISA in N. Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995), and rejected an overly broad view of the preemption clause's
"relates to" language. Id. at 662.
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (stating that an ERISA fiduciary should use "the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims" in relation to an ERISA plan).
27. The term "fiduciary," as used in this Note, refers to an ERISA "fiduciary" as defined at
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A):
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (discussing the standard of care imposed upon fiduciaries under
ERISA).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (describing the scope and nature of remedies against
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incurred because of the breach. 30 Any plan beneficiary, participant, or other
fiduciary can bring a civil action for damages resulting from a breach of
fiduciary duty.3' In determining whether a person or organization is a fiduciary,
courts generally apply a "functional" test,32 centering on whether the person or
organization:
(i)... exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)... renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority
or responsibility to do so, or (iii)... has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
33
Courts have further focused on the "discretionary authority ' 34 language found
in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 35  Because nonfiduciaries are not liable for
monetary damages even if they intentionally participate in a breach of fiduciary
duty,36 the finding of fiduciary status is a prerequisite for imposing fiduciary
fiduciaries who breach their duty).
30. See id. ("Any person who is a fiduciary... shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach [of fiduciary duty].").
31. See id. § 1132(a)(2)-(3) (listing those persons eligible to bring a civil action for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA). The Supreme Court held in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 512 (1996), that a participant or beneficiary may proceed under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1 132(a)(3) to obtain individual "'appropriate' equitable relief." Varity Corp., 515 U.S. at 515.
In previous cases, the Court indicated that the term "equitable" gave participants and
beneficiaries traditional injunctive remedies and monetary remedies of disgorgement and
restitution, but not legal damages. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248,253-56 (1993)
(stating legal damages not available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). The Eighth Circuit in
Varity Corp. construed this pronouncement to mean that participants and beneficiaries are not
entitled to recover compensatory damages for breaches of fiduciary duty. See Howe v. Varity
Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aft'd, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (construing equitable relief
as not providing for compensatory damages).
32. See Robert N. Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 415 PRACTICING L. INST.-
TAX 9, 14 (1998) ("Courts have described the test of determining fiduciary status as a
'functional' one....").
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006).
34. Id. ("[Al person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent... he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.").
35. See, e.g., Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1992)
(emphasizing the broad scope of the functional approach to fiduciary status under ERISA based
upon the "discretionary authority" language); Acosta v. Pac. Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 617-18 (9th
Cir. 1991) (stating that a person's actions rather than their official designation dictate fiduciary
status under ERISA).
36. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1993) (stating that a
nonfiduciary is not liable under ERISA for a breach of fiduciary duty, even when intentional).
Courts have also severely restricted the equitable relief available against a nonfiduciary. See,
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liability.37 Some positions are, without question, fiduciary positions under
ERISA.38 These positions include plan administrators 39 and plan trustees, who
by the very nature of the position, have "discretionary authority" within the
meaning of § 1002(21)(A).4° Some courts have used the functional approach to
hold individuals within a corporation who perform the functions necessary to
make the corporation a fiduciary individually liable as fiduciaries themselves.41
In Confer v. Custom Engineering Co.,42 however, the Third Circuit limited
e.g., Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that ERISA's remedies under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) do not apply against a nonfiduciary unless he is a party-in-interest as
defined by § 1002(14)).
37. See Bruce D. Pingree, Fiduciary Issues in Welfare Plans, in ERISA FIDuCIARY LAW
87 (Susan P. Serota ed., 1995) (discussing the criteria used to identify welfare benefit plan
fiduciaries).
38. See Eccles, supra note 32, at 13 (1998) (discussing the defined fiduciaries under
ERISA).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2006) (presenting the criteria for those persons defined
as plan administrators within ERISA).
40. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-8(D-3) (1999) ("Some offices or positions of an employee
benefit plan by their very nature require persons who hold them to perform one or more of the
functions described in § 3(21)(A) of the Act.... Persons who hold such positions will therefore
be fiduciaries.").
41. See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 135 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
nonfiduciaries who appoint plan administrators have a duty to take prudent and reasonable
action to determine whether the administrators are fulfilling their fiduciary duties when they
have knowledge of a potential conflict of interest).
42. See Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34,37 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that when a
corporation serves as an ERISA fiduciary, the officers who exercise discretion on behalf of that
corporation are not fiduciaries unless the officers have individual discretionary roles in plan
administration). In Confer, the Third Circuit considered whether "plan supervisors" or the
officers of a corporate plan administrator, as individuals, are fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A). Id. at 35. Confer was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought to recover
benefits after his employer fraudulently amended its employee benefit plan to exclude
motorcycle accidents and initially denied his claim. Id. Both the named plan administrator and
plan supervisor were corporate entities, yet Confer sought to recover against the President and
Vice President of Custom Engineering as well. Id. The court affirmed that a breach of fiduciary
duty occurred when the corporation amended its plan to exclude Confer's claim via a backdated
amendment. Id. The court also found that corporations can serve as fiduciaries based upon 29
U.S.C. § 1002(9). Confer, 952 F.2d at 37. However, the court then held that when an ERISA
plan names a corporation as a fiduciary, the officers who exercise discretion on behalf of that
corporation are not fiduciaries under ERISA unless it can be shown that these officers have
individual discretionary roles as to plan administration. Id. Because neither the company
president nor vice president acted in an individual manner, but rather as agents of Custom
Engineering, they caused the company to breach its fiduciary duty but did not become
fiduciaries themselves. Id. at 38. The court therefore upheld grants of summary judgment in
favor of both the president and vice president. Id. at 39.
1080
OFFSHORE GAMBLING
individual liability for officers of a fiduciary corporation so long as the
individual acted within the corporate structure.43
While the scope of the functional test is very broad, there are limits on
who qualifies as an ERISA fiduciary. The language of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) limits fiduciary status by stating that a person is a fiduciary "to
the extent" she performs one of the listed functions.44 Courts often find that
people may be fiduciaries when they do certain things, but that they are entitled
to act in their own interest when they do others.45 Persons having "purely
ministerial" functions, such as applying rules regarding benefit eligibility or
making recommendations to others with respect to plan administration, are
generally not fiduciaries. 46 The fact-intensive nature of determining fiduciary
status lends itself to contrary conclusions depending on the forum, yet remains
a critical step in evaluating ERISA liability.
47
C. The Fiduciary Duty
Once a person or entity qualifies as a fiduciary, it is important to
understand the nature of the duty imposed upon them. ERISA establishes two
43. See Confer, 952 F.2d at 37 (limiting the scope of fiduciary duty for officers within a
corporate entity that serve as a named fiduciary).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining the criteria used to determine a person's fiduciary
status under ERISA).
45. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 214 (2000) (holding that treatment
decisions made by a health maintenance organization through its physician employees do not
qualify as fiduciary acts under ERISA); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 104 (1993) (stating that a fiduciary is only subject to fiduciary duty when
making decisions regarding discretionary aspects of a plan); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen
Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that an administrative firm is
not a fiduciary for purposes of its own selection as service provider, although it could become a
fiduciary by controlling its own compensation); Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d
1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that an employer was a fiduciary because it appointed a plan
administrator, but is not itself a fiduciary with respect to plan administration); Schulist v. Blue
Cross of Iowa, 717 F.2d 1127, 1130-32 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Blue Cross may have been
a fiduciary for purposes of claims administration but not with respect to selecting itself as a
service provider or setting its rate of compensation).
46. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8(D-2) (1999) ("[A] person who performs purely ministerial
functions such as the types described above for an employee benefit plan within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other persons is not a
fiduciary.").
47. See Pingree, supra note 37, at 88 (discussing different scenarios and possible
outcomes relating to the determination of fiduciary status under ERISA).
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central duties to guide the actions of fiduciaries.48 The first duty is to act
"solely in the interest" of beneficiaries.49 The second is the duty of disclosure.50
The first duty that applies in the health care context is the duty to act in the
sole interest of the plan participant. ERISA requires that fiduciaries "discharge
[their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to [plan]
participants... and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."5'
In Donovan v. Bierwirth,52 the court noted that this provision, along with
ERISA's related prudence requirement,53 imposes three "different, although
overlapping" duties derived from trust law.54 Although courts occasionally
distinguish between them, most courts have treated the "solely in the interest"
and "exclusive purpose" standards interchangeably as codifications of the trust
law duty of undivided loyalty.55 While the duty to act "solely in the interest"
48. See Eccles, supra note 32, at 365 (discussing the basic duties imposed on plan
fiduciaries under section 404(a)(l)(A) of ERISA).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (2006) (describing the prudent man standard of care as it
entails loyalty to the interests of the plan participants).
50. See Ethan Lipsig & Joshua H. Sternoff, Fiduciary Disclosure Obligations, in ERISA
FIDUciARY LAW 320 (Susan P. Serota ed., Supp. 2003) (discussing the judicial origins of the
duty of disclosure and its relationship to the statutory elements of ERISA).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
52. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that trustees of
a corporate pension plan who were also officers of the corporation violated their fiduciary duty
when they refused to sell the pension plan's stock during a hostile takeover attempt). The court
in Donovan examined whether the failure of ERISA fiduciaries-who were officers of
Grumman Corporation-to accept an offer and subsequent purchase of additional company
stock during an hostile takeover attempt violated 29 U.S.C. § 1104. Donovan, 680 F.2d at 264.
The Grumman plan trustees refused an offer from LTV Corporation to acquire seventy percent
of outstanding stock for forty-five dollars a share when the shares were trading at approximately
thirty-eight dollars on the open market. Id. The trustees had done some preliminary
investigation into the effect of the takeover on the pension plan but not in accordance with the
high standard of management imposed upon fiduciaries. Id. at 273. The trustees also realized
that the acquisition of the pension plan's stocks would be critical to the success of LTV
Corporation's takeover bid. Id. at 266-67. Although the trustees believed the takeover bid
threatened the long-term viability of the pension plan, their decision to refuse the buyout was
inappropriately linked to their desire as officers of the corporation to defeat the takeover bid. Id.
at 272-73.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (stating that a fiduciary should use "the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims" in relation to an ERISA plan).
54. See Donovan, 680 F.2d at 271 (discussing the three overlapping standards and their
distinguishing factors).
55. See, e.g., Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453,457 (1 Oth Cir. 1978) (comparing the fiduciary
standard found in ERISA with the traditional law of trusts).
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generally applies to situations where the fiduciary acts in his personal interest, it
is not completely unqualified.56 Some courts have held that a fiduciary's
actions may confer a benefit upon the fiduciary so long as the action was in the
best interests of the plan.57 In Donovan, the Second Circuit stated that a
fiduciary may take action that benefits his own interests so long as the action
also benefits plan participants.
58
The Supreme Court recently scrutinized ERISA's fiduciary duty as applied
to physicians and health medical organizations in Pegram v. Herdrich.59
Pegram held that decisions that combine treatment decisions and eligibility
decisions are not fiduciary in character.60  Therefore, a health care plan in
which doctors receive year-end bonuses based upon their rationing of expensive
medical services does not breach ERISA's fiduciary duty because a decision
56. See, e.g., Wrightv. Nimmons, 641 F. Supp. 1391,1408 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding that
the fiduciary blatantly disregarded his fiduciary duty to the plan in setting his compensation).
57. See Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ("[A] trustee may
make management decisions that incidentally benefit the plan or the trustees provided the
judgment is prudent and primarily promotes the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.").
58. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir. 1982) (allowing for fiduciaries
to make decisions benefiting both themselves and plan participants). The court stated:
Although officers of a corporation who are trustees of its pension plan do not
violate their duties as trustees by taking action which, after careful and impartial
investigation, they reasonably conclude best to promote the interests of participants
and beneficiaries simply because it incidentally benefits the corporation or, indeed,
themselves, their decisions must be made with an eye single to the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries.
Id.
59. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 214 (2000) (holding that treatment decisions
made by a health maintenance organization through its physician employees do not qualify as
fiduciary acts under ERISA). In Pegram, the Supreme Court reviewed an appellate court's
decision that a health maintenance organization's provision rewarding physicians for limiting
medical care constituted a violation of ERISA's fiduciary duty, because the policy created an
incentive for physicians to act in their own self-interest rather than the exclusive interest of plan
participants. Id. at 220. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that such a
policy did not constitute of breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 214. The Court distinguished
between two types of administrative decisions made by health maintenance organizations and
their physicians: eligibility decisions and treatment decisions. Id. at 228-29. Eligibility
decisions are the decisions regarding whether a plan covers a particular condition or the
procedure for its treatment, while treatment decisions are the choices about how to diagnose and
treat a patient's symptoms. Id. at 228. Treatment decisions and eligibility decisions, however,
are often "inextricably mixed" according to the Court. Id. It was not Congress's intent to treat
health maintenance organizations or their physicians as fiduciaries when making such mixed
eligibility decisions, and therefore, decisions found to encompass both aspects are not subject to
fiduciary duty requirements. Id. at 231.
60. See id. at 231 ("[W]e think Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to be
treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its
physicians.").
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treatment and eligibility is so mixed that it would be impossible to distinguish
between a physician's judgment and possible financial motivation.6' Although
the Court did leave open the possibility of some extreme plans violating
ERISA's fiduciary duty,62 Pegram weakens the duty to act in the sole interest
of plan participants.
Four years after Pegram, the Supreme Court narrowed and clarified the
scope of Pegram with its holding in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.63 Aetna
limited Pegram's scope, clarifying that the "mixed decisions 64 referenced in
Pegram only avoid ERISA's fiduciary duties when a treating physician or the
treating physician's employer made the decision.65 The Court's holding in
Aetna restores ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement to any benefit or eligibility
decision made by a plan administrator, even when such decisions turn
extensively on medical judgment.66 Post-Aetna, mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions are defined as "medical necessity decisions made by the plaintiff's
treating physician qua treating physician and qua benefits administrator.
'" 67
61. See id. at 228-29 (stating that a physician's eligibility and treatment decisions cannot
be separated from the physician's professional judgment and therefore cannot be analyzed under
a fiduciary lens).
62. See id. at 227 n.7 ("It does not follow that those who administer a particular plan
design may not have difficulty in following fiduciary standards if the design is awkward
enough.").
63. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that the district
court's decision to remand claims against an HMO to state court was in error and that ERISA
preempted respondent's claims). In Aetna, the Supreme Court considered whether ERISA
preempted state suits brought against HMO's which were based upon refusal to cover certain
medical services and procedures. Id. at 204-07. Respondents relied heavily upon the Court's
decision in Pegram, arguing the broad scope of Pegram's exclusion of mixed decisions allowed
for their claims to rest outside of ERISA. Aetna, 542 U.S. at 218. The Court disagreed, stating
Pegram was not to be so broadly applied. Aetna, 542 U.S. at 218. "A benefit determination
under ERISA... is generally a fiduciary act." Id. The Court stated that Pegram only applied
when the "'underlying negligence also plausibly constitutes medical maltreatment by a party
who can be deemed to be a treating physician or such as a physician's employer."' Id. at 221
(quoting Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)). Therefore,
the ultimate decision maker in any plan regarding the award of benefits qualifies as a fiduciary
and to classify any entity with discretionary authority over the award of benefits as anything but
a fiduciary would conflict with ERISA's scope and purpose. Id. at 220.
64. Pegram, 550 U.S. at 228.
65. See Aetna, 542 U.S. at 221 (limiting the exclusionary scope of Pegram to those mixed
decisions made by a treating physician or the physician's employer).
66. See id. at 220 (stating that administrators making benefits decisions based heavily
upon medical judgment still generally qualify as plan fiduciaries under ERISA).




The second duty ERISA imposes on fiduciaries is the duty of disclosure.
Much confusion exists among the courts as to the source and the scope of this
duty.68  The first branch of this duty is to avoid affirmative
misrepresentations.69 In Varity Corp. v. Howe,7 ° the Supreme Court held that
§ 1104(a)'s duty to act "solely in the interest of [plan] participants" is
inconsistent with lying to a participant. 7' The Court, therefore, concluded that a
fiduciary has a duty not to make misrepresentations about the plan.72 Several
courts have extended the duty of disclosure to include a duty of affirmative
disclosure.73 The D.C. Circuit held that when a beneficiary contacts the
68. See Lipsig & Stemoff, supra note 50, at 320 (discussing the judicial origins of the
duty of disclosure and the variety of methods by which courts have defined the duty).
69. See id. at 323-24 ("[A] fiduciary breaches its fiduciary duty if a participant suffers a
resultant harm from a fiduciary's material misrepresentation."); see also Daniels v. Thomas &
Betts Corp., 263 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (listing material misrepresentation of fact as an
issue in resolving fiduciary duty claims under ERISA).
70. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,491 (1996) (holding that Varity Corporation
acted as a fiduciary when it deliberately misled plan participants and, in doing so, violated the
fiduciary duty imposed under ERISA). In Varity, the Supreme Court considered three
questions: (1) was Varity acting in its capacity as an ERISA "fiduciary" when it significantly
and deliberately misled plan beneficiaries; (2) in misleading the beneficiaries, did Varity violate
its fiduciary obligations under ERISA; and (3) does ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorize
beneficiaries to bring a lawsuit that seeks relief for individual beneficiaries harmed by an
administrator's breach of fiduciary obligations. Id. at 491. Varity convinced several divisions
of its employees to voluntarily transfer their pension plans to a new subsidiary of Varity by
assuring them of the financial stability of the subsidy. Id. at 493-94. The subsidy had truthfully
been set up to consolidate many of Varity's loss prone enterprises and its business plan foresaw
a relatively high chance of failure. Id. Varity also wished to transfer employees' ERISA plans
to the subsidies because debt represented by the plans could be eliminated if the subsidy went
bankrupt without the public fallout foreseen from simply canceling the plans without
justification. Id. The Court found that Varity was both the employer and the plan administrator
and therefore was subject to the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA. Id. at 498. Therefore, in
attempting to cut losses by convincing employees to move their benefit plans to a failing
subsidy, Varity breached its fiduciary duty to the plan participants. Id. at 503, 506. ERISA's
fiduciary duty is not consistent with deceiving a plan's participants in order to save a
corporation money. Id. at 506. Finally, the beneficiaries' suit was authorized under ERISA. Id.
at 515.
71. See id. at 506 ("[L]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries
and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)." (citing Peoria Union
Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983))).
72. See id. ("To participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries
in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense is not to act solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries.").
73. See, e.g., Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours &Co., 237 F.3d 371,380(4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that a fiduciary is "at times" obligated to affirmatively provide information to the
beneficiary without being asked affirmatively); Palen v. Kmart Corp., No. 97-2269, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10780, at *10-12 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (citing Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp.,
173 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999)) (stating that ERISA's fiduciary duty includes a duty to
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fiduciary about his status and options within the plan, the fiduciary has an
obligation to provide complete and correct material information.74 The Third
Circuit also found an affirmative duty to disclose in certain circumstances,
holding that when the fiduciary notices that a failure to disclose will cause harm
to a plan participant, the fiduciary has a duty to convey "complete and accurate
information material to the beneficiary's circumstance. 7 5 In another case, the
Third Circuit went even further in holding that a specific request by a
participant is not necessary to find that the fiduciary had a duty to disclose
information material to the participant's situation.76 The court made clear that a
fiduciary has an affirmative duty to disclose material information even in the
absence of an inquiry by a beneficiary.77 Not all circuits, however, have
adopted this expansive view of the duty of disclosure.78 Pocchia v. NYNEX
Corp.79 rejected the argument that a fiduciary is obligated to make voluntary
affirmatively disclose information when the fiduciary knows failure to disclose would result in
harm to the beneficiary).
74. See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins., 919 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that the
ERISA fiduciary duty requires a fiduciary not only to refrain from misinforming a beneficiary
but to also inform them with correct and complete information).
75. See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating that a fiduciary is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material
facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary). The court further stated that a fiduciary's
obligations will not be excused merely because a participant failed to comprehend or ask about a
technical aspect of a plan. Id.
76. See Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1016 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that a
specific request for information is not necessary to create an affirmative duty to inform).
77. See id. ("[I]t is clear that circumstances known to the fiduciary can give rise to this
affirmative obligation [to inform] even absent a request by the beneficiary." (citing Glaziers &
Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1181
(3d Cir. 1996))).
78. See Switzer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A] plan
administrator does not have any fiduciary duty to determine whether confusion about a plan
term or condition exists. It is only after the plan administrator does receive an inquiry that it has
a fiduciary obligation to respond promptly and adequately in a way that is not misleading.").
79. See Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275,278 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a plan
fiduciary is not required to voluntarily disclose upcoming changes in plan policy until said
updates are put into effect, even if the fiduciary is aware of the changes). In Pocchia, the
Second Circuit considered whether a fiduciary is required under ERISA to voluntarily disclose
his knowledge of upcoming changes to a benefit plan before the changes are adopted. Id. at
278-79. Plaintiff brought suit against NYNEX after NYNEX implemented changes in its
retirement plans several months after plaintiff retired. Id. at 277. Plaintiff claimed NYNEX
breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA by not informing him of its decision to implement the
new plan during his retirement negotiations. Id. The court held that a fiduciary is not required
to voluntarily disclose changes in plan policy until such changes are enacted, regardless of
knowledge. Id. at 278.
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disclosures to beneficiaries absent an inquiry.80 The ultimate scope of this duty,
therefore, is somewhat unclear.8 '
D. ERISA Fiduciaries in Health Care Plans
After evaluating fiduciary characteristics, the next inquiry becomes who,
within the context of a health care plan, is a fiduciary. This subpart will
examine the three major agents in a typical health care plan: the health care
plan itself, the physician organization responsible for delivering care, and the
individual physician who provides the care.
1. The Health Care Plan
The health care plan as a corporate entity is the clearest example of an
ERISA fiduciary in contemporary health care systems. While the term "health
care plan" is somewhat vague, it generally describes the various corporate
structures created in response to the move toward integrating health care
services.82  Health medical organizations (HMOs), preferred provider
organizations (PPOs), 83 physician hospital organizations (PHOs),84 and other
integrated delivery systems, including employers that act as both insurers and
health care providers, are common examples of health care plans.8 5 Many
80. See id. (stating that a fiduciary does not have to make voluntary disclosures to plan
participants without inquiry by the participant).
81. See Lipsig & Stemoff, supra note 50, at 320 (discussing the lack of consensus
between circuits as to the limits and scope of the duty to disclose under ERISA).
82. See DONALD K. FREEBORN & CLYDE R. POPE, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE IN
MANAGED CARE: THE PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE MODEL 2-6 (1994) (discussing the various
forms of health care plans in the U.S.); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N ANN. REP.
(1995), reprinted in BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW 521-24 (3d ed. 1997)
(providing a general discussion of the corporate elements of health care plans in the U.S.).
83. See Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability
Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1223-26 (1997) (listing
PPOs as a type of managed care). Examples of"managed care" include: the health maintenance
organization (HMO), which is an organization that fully integrates the insurance and provider
aspects of health care delivery; the preferred provider organization (PPO), which is a less
integrated version of an HMO, in which physicians often maintain independent practices; and
the physician hospital organization (PHO), which is an entity comprised of a hospital and its
affiliated physicians that offers centralized management, but a less integrated structure than an
HMO. Id. at 1224 n.22, 1223-26 (discussing three forms of managed health care plans).
84. See id. at 1225 (contrasting PHOs with other types of health care plans).
85. See id. at 1223-26 (discussing the various types of health care systems found in the
United States and their distinguishing characteristics).
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courts have held that because health care plans generally "exercise[]
discretionary control over the administration of the plan and for the payment of
benefits, 86 they qualify as fiduciaries under ERISA.87 Although health care
plans take many forms88 and an examination of the organization's discretionary
control over plan administration and payment of benefits remains essential,
most plans will exercise the requisite discretion and qualify as ERISA
fiduciaries.
2. The Physician Organization Providing Care to Plan Participants
While health care plans generally qualify as ERISA fiduciaries, the
classification of a physician association is less clear. A physician
organization's role within health care systems is generally to provide office-
based primary care via contract.89  A common example of a physician
organization is the independent practice association (IPA),90 in which
physicians organize for the purpose of negotiating contracts to provide services
to health plan subscribers. 9' The scope of the physician organization's duties
will vary by the contract, but generally include negotiating contracts with
insurers, consolidating practice management functions, and utilizing expensive
medical technology by sharing of equipment and costs. 92 The organization may
also provide information to the health care plan in connection with its
prospective utilization review of hospital admissions and specialist referrals.93
86. Morales v. Health Plus, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 464, 468 (D.P.R. 1997).
87. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding the
defendant HMO to be a fiduciary under ERISA because it exercised discretionary control of the
plan and over the payment of benefits); Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that an HMO is an ERISA fiduciary when it exercises discretion over
administration of plan).
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing examples of managed care).
89. See Noah, supra note 83, at 1223 (describing the various forms of health care plan
management); see also CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. ROzOvSKY, MANAGED CARE AND THE
LAW: LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2.4.1 (2003) (discussing the role of physician
organizations in providing health care services through HMOs).
90. See Brant S. Mittler & Andre Hampton, The Princess and the Pea: The Assurance of
Voluntary Compliance Between the Texas Attorney General and AETNA 's Texas HMOs and Its
Impact on Financial Risk Shifting by Managed Care, 83 B.U. L. REv. 553, 556 n.11 (2003)
("An IPA is defined as the simplest form of physician organization.").
91. See PATRICIA YOUNGER ET AL., LEGAL ANSWER BOOK FOR MANAGED CARE 14 (1995)
(describing the function and setup of independent practice associations).
92. See id. (discussing the various functions of physician organizations such as group
practices and independent practice associations).
93. See Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications ofHMO Cost Containment Measures, 14
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Courts will likely classify such activity as "purely ministerial," 94 because the
physician organization is simply following preestablished guidelines rather than
exercising its own discretion.95 A physician organization's contractual
relationship might provide discretionary authority over plan administration and
payment of claims, but such a situation is exceptional.96  Even in such a
circumstance, ERISA fiduciary status is limited to those actions in which the
person or group is acting in a discretionary capacity.97  The physician
organization may act as a fiduciary when making administrative decisions
regarding the health plan but not when making medical or business decisions
that relate to the management of the physician organization.98 The fiduciary
status of physician organizations, therefore, is a fact-intensive issue that must
be decided on a case-by-case basis.99
3. The Physician
The status of a physician as an ERISA fiduciary is somewhat unclear, but
it appears that a physician is not an ERISA fiduciary. Courts classifying a
health plan as an ERISA fiduciary have based their conclusion on the fact that
the health plan "exercises discretionary control over the administration of the
plan and for the payment of benefits." 10o The physician's primary role within a
SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 79, 80 (1990) (noting that as a cost-saving technique HMOs often review
doctors' decisions to use expensive medical interventions).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1999).
95. See id. (stating that persons following rules and procedures set by others are not
ERISA fiduciaries).
96. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-29 (2000) (stating that a physician's
eligibility and treatment decisions cannot be separated from the physician's professional
judgment and therefore cannot be analyzed under a fiduciary lens even though the decision may
impact plan administration).
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006) (stating that a person is an ERISA fiduciary only
to the extent the person exercises discretionary authority).
98. A person is a fiduciary only to the extent he or she has discretion over plan
management or administration. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1999). A person is not considered a
fiduciary when he or she makes decisions based on policies, interpretations, and rules
established by others. Id. Therefore, medical and business decisions made by physician
organizations are distinct from decisions involving plan management or administration, as such
decisions relate to the management of the physician organization, not the management or
administration of the health plan.
99. See Pingree, supra note 37, at 88 (stating that determining fiduciary status is often a
fact intensive exercise based upon the form of the health care provider).
100. Morales v. Health Plus, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 464,468 (D.P.R. 1997); see also O'Reilly
v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding the defendant HMO to be a
fiduciary under ERISA because it exercised discretionary control of the plan and over the
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health plan is to provide medical care directly to plan participants."' Although
a physician exercises a substantial amount of discretion when making medical
decisions-arguably enough discretion to make a physician an ERISA
fiduciary-the health plan ultimately maintains control over management of the
plan and over many of the physician's decisions. 0 2 Because fiduciary status
requires control and discretion,10 3 and because ultimate control remains with the
health plan, 104 a physician would not be an ERISA fiduciary.
Two additional arguments exist against treating a physician as an ERISA
fiduciary. First, physicians should not qualify as fiduciaries when performing
professional functions because they lack ultimate authority with regard to plan
administration.'0 5 Second, the fact that the law imposes independent fiduciary
duties on a physician in the form of malpractice liability'0 6 ensures the quality
of service ERISA fiduciary duties seek to ensure. Both arguments recognize
that the physician's exercise of professional medical discretion is distinct from
decisions made with regard to the health care plan. 0 7 In effect, the physician
has an express contract with the health plan and an implicit contract with the
patient.10 8 The discretion exercised in prescribing medical treatment relates to
the physician's contract with the patient-for which he is already subject to
liability for malpractice. Furthermore, no reported decision holds that a treating
physician qualifies as an ERISA fiduciary. Because a physician's medical
payment of benefits); Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that an HMO is an ERISA fiduciary when it exercises discretion over administration of
a plan).
101. See Noah, supra note 83, at 1223 (describing a physician's role within the health care
system).
102. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS 139 (1993) (discussing the
administrative procedures used by HMO's to control and influence the majority of decisions a
physician makes within the plan context).
103. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (stating a person is a fiduciary only to the extent he or she
has discretion over plan management or administration and that a person is not considered a
fiduciary when he or she makes decisions based on policies, interpretations, and rules
established by others).
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the methods health care
providers use to maintain control over physician's decisions).
105. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1999) (stating that professionals should not be considered
ERISA fiduciaries solely for providing professional services to a health plan, but instead must
meet one of the statutory prerequisites).
106. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 82, at 360 (discussing the medical tort system and the
duties inherent in preventing malpractice liability).
107. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-29 (2000) (stating that a physician's
eligibility and treatment decisions cannot be separated from the physician's discretionary
professional judgment and therefore cannot be analyzed under a fiduciary lens).
108. See id. at 223 (discussing the contractual status between doctors and patients).
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decisions are distinct from the exercise of any administrative discretion, a
physician will likely not qualify as a fiduciary under ERISA.
Although health care plans are the only clear examples of ERISA
fiduciaries in the health care context, the exclusion of physicians and
physicians' organizations actually serves to narrow the scope of potential
ERISA liability resulting from medical outsourcing.' 9 The next Part will
examine the newly developing practice of medical outsourcing and analyze
both the potential benefits and risks present in this burgeoning industry.
III. Medical Outsourcing
A. History and Practice
The term "medical outsourcing" in the context of this Note refers to
treatments or surgeries that have been planned in advance to take place outside
of a patient's usual country of residence." 0 The practice of medical
outsourcing finds its roots in medical tourism,' a term describing the practice
of visiting a foreign country in order to have cosmetic surgical procedures
performed at lower costs. " 2 Although the practice of medical tourism is not
particularly new, "tourists" generally sought low-cost alternatives to expensive
cosmetic surgical procedures not covered by health insurance plans." 3 Medical
outsourcing, however, tends to focus on finding low-cost alternatives to
noncosmetic procedures ranging from hip' 14 or knee 1'5 transplants to highly
109. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding the
defendant HMO to be a fiduciary under ERISA because it exercised discretionary control of the
plan and over the payment of benefits); Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that an HMO is an ERISA fiduciary when it exercises discretion over
administration of plan). See also infra Part II.D (discussing the fiduciary duty imposed by
ERISA and the scope of its application).
110. See Atul D. Garud, Medical Tourism and its Impact on our Health Care, 18 NAT'L
MED. J. INDIA 318-19 (2005) (discussing growth of medical tourism and its impact on India's
health care infrastructure).
111. See Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World:
Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (discussing
the intersection of medical tourism and commercial outsourcing as a catalyst for the rise of
medical outsourcing).
112. See id. (defining medical tourism and describing the evolution of the connotation of
medical tourist).
113. See id. (discussing the different motivating factors for medical tourists).
114. See id. (discussing the wide variety of medical procedures available for medical
outsourcing).
115. See Unmesh Kher, Outsourcing Your Heart, TIME, May 21, 2006, at 44-47
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technical and critical procedures such as double-heart-bypass surgery 1 6 and
spinal surgery.' 7 The expansion of surgical services both sought and offered to
medical tourists finds its commercial origins in the aftermath of the Asian
financial crisis of 1997.118 Hospitals such as Bumrungrad International in
Bangkok, Thailand began heavily recruiting foreign patients, and exponential
growth occurred as a result of dramatically lower price points for comparable
care." 19 In 2005, Bumrungrad International alone drew over 400,000 foreign
12 121patients, with 55,000 Americans, 20 a 30% increase from the previous year.'
While these visits are nominal in comparison to the millions of surgeries
performed annually in the $2 trillion U.S. health care system,122 some analysts
believe they represent the beginning of a consumer movement rejecting
seemingly out of control domestic health care costs.
23
B. Benefits and Risks of Medical Outsourcing
Three major factors are the primary motivators for patients seeking
medical treatment overseas. The significant cost savings available remains the
most prominent factor, but similar standards of care and access to alternative
medicines and procedures also play a prominent role. 24 This subpart examines
(discussing the various types of medical procedures popular in foreign hospitals).
116. See id. (presenting an example of a person's experience as an open heart surgery
patient abroad).
117. See, e.g., Bumrungrad International Hospital--Orthopedics Center, http://www.
bumrungrad.com/htm/eng/main.asp?Filename=clinic/ortho.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007)
(detailing the wide range of care provided at Bumrungrad International) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See CBS News: Outsourcing Health with Overseas Remedies (CBS News television
broadcast Nov. 4, 2006), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/04/health/main
2153345.shtml (discussing the factors leading to the expansion of the overseas health care
market).
119. See id. (discussing the advertising strategies used to encourage medical tourism).
120. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 1638 (providing statistics on the patients
treated at Bumrungrad International). Eighty-three percent of those American patients sought
noncosmetic surgical treatment. Id.
121. See id. (stating the number of American patients treated at Bumrungrad increased
approximately 30% over the past year).
122. See Kher, supra note 115, at 44 (discussing the economic size and importance of the
U.S. health care system).
123. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 1638 (discussing the unmanageable costs of
health care for low and middle-class American families and its role as a catalyst in the
development of medical outsourcing).
124. See Terry, supra note 111 (describing the three central factors patients consider when
opting to undergo medical procedures abroad).
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and presents a critical cost-benefit analysis of each factor. Finally, the subpart
discusses the most overlooked risk associated with medical outsourcing, the
lack of legal protection in the U.S. court system.
1. Cost Savings
The cost savings associated with medical outsourcing simply cannot be
overstated. While costs vary geographically, the average surgical procedure
performed in Asia will cost only 20%-25% as much as the comparable
American procedure.125 The following table provides a brief list of surgical
procedures and a comparison of costs between the United States, India,
Thailand, and Singapore:
Table 1126
Angioplasty Gastric Bypass Heart Bypass Heart Valve
Replacement
U.S. $25,000-37,000 $27,000-40,000 $54,000-79,000 $71,000-103,000
Insurer's
Cost
U.S. Retail $57,000-82,000 $48,000-69,000 $122,000-176,000 $159,000-230,000
India $11,000 $11,000 $10,000 $9,500
Retail
Thailand $13,000 $15,000 $12,000 $10,500
Retail
Singapore $13,000 $15,000 $20,000 $13,000
Retail
Knee Replacement Spinal Fusion Hip Replacement Mastectomy
U.S. $1 7,000-25,000 $25,000-36,000 $18,000-26,000 $9,000-14,000
Insurer's
Cost
U.S. Retail $40,000-58,000 $62,000-90,000 $43,000-63,000 $23,000-34,000
India $8,500 $5,500 $9,000 $7,500
Retail I
Thailand $10,000 $7,000 $12,000 $9,000
Retail
Singapore $13,000 $9,000 $12,000 $12,400
Retail I
125. See Kher, supra note 115, at 44 ("Procedures in Thailand and Malaysia... cost only
20% to 25% as much as comparable ones in the U.S.").
126. See id. at 47 (providing a comparative table of medical procedure costs in the United
States and three foreign locations).
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As the data indicates, the difference in cost to the consumer is even greater
than the savings experienced by insurance companies, with some savings
reaching greater than ninety percent. 127 Further, assuming medical costs in the
United States continue to trend upward, the economic appeal of medical
outsourcing will continue to increase. 128 In fact, 2006 marked the first year in
which the average health care expenditures for a family of four exceeded the
entire annual earnings of a minimum-wage employee.1
29
The significant differences in health care costs between the United States
and global competitors stem from a variety of different causes, one of the most
significant being the difference in malpractice insurance premiums.' 30 In
Thailand, for example, the average doctor will pay approximately $5,000 in
medical malpractice insurance for one year's coverage.' 31 Contrast this with
malpractice premiums in the United States, which can cost up to $100,000 a
year for specialists, and a major source of Thailand's savings becomes clear.'32
However, it is important to note that the lower insurance premiums outside of
the United States directly relate to the risk they serve to mitigate-malpractice
damage awards. The largest medical malpractice award in Thailand to date was
only $100,000.133 Although the average award in the United States comes to
approximately $1 million, 134 the average malpractice award payout was
$308,000. 13 The comparatively low amount of damages in Asia is due largely
127. See id. (noting that heart valve replacement, for example, might cost up to $236,000 in
the United States and only $13,000 in Singapore, a difference of approximately 96%).
128. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 1639 (stating that as health care costs continue
to rise, the number of households priced out of the market will increase and therefore enter the
medical outsourcing market).
129. See id. (discussing the high impact health care costs have on low and middle income
Americans).
130. See Mark Roth, A Cheaper Medical Alternative; For Those With Minimal Health
Insurance, Getting Surgery Abroad May Be a Sound Option, PTTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Sept.
10, 2006, at GI (discussing the various factors leading to lower costs for surgical procedures
abroad).
131. Id.
132. See id. (comparing medical malpractice insurance premiums in the United States to
those paid by doctors in foreign countries where medical outsourcing is prevalent).
133. Id.
134. See Insurance Information Institute, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/
medicalmal/ (last visited May 17, 2007) (stating that the median medical malpractice jury award
is approximately one million dollars) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Payments on Medical Malpractice Claims, 2006,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2007) (providing data and award payment




to the fact that the law does not permit damages for pain and suffering.136
Method of payment is another major source of savings in foreign health care
systems. 137 At Bumrungrad International, for example, approximately seventy-
five percent of its patients pay for their treatment in cash. 38 Cash payments
result in dramatically less added expense via insurance processing fees, which
can run as high as 10% in the U.S. health care system.
139
The significant cost savings available overseas means little, however,
unless it motivates persons to go through the hassle and risk of traveling before
and after surgery and recovering in a foreign environment. A study
commissioned by Dr. Arnold Milstein 40 suggests that economic motivation
comes into play well below the possible savings illustrated in Table 1 141 Poll
results suggest that few consumers would chose to undergo surgical procedures
abroad for financial incentives below $1,000.142 For savings between $1,000
and $5,000, however, the numbers increase dramatically. 143 Forty-five percent
of uninsured or underinsured consumers stated they would travel abroad to take
advantage of savings, while 19% of insured respondents responded
affirmatively. 144  When potential savings increased above $5,000, the
percentage of those willing to travel increased to 61% and 40% respectively. 145
The large number of persons willing to travel abroad for discount surgical
procedures highlights the importance of financial incentives in medical
136. See Roth, supra note 130, at G1 (discussing malpractice award limits in Thailand and
India).
137. See id. (discussing other sources of cost savings at Bumrungrad International
Hospital).
138. See id. ("Seventy-Five percent of [Bumrungrand International's] patients pay cash.").
139. See Cybele Weisser & Amanda Gengler, 50 Ways to Cut Your Health-Care Costs, in
MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/popups/2006/moneymag/health care/index.html (last visited July
12, 2007) (stating that most doctors lose thousands each year on credit-card processing fees and
that cash payment can result in up to a ten percent discount) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
140. Dr. Milstein is the chief physician at Mercer Health and Benefits and medical director
of the Pacific Business Group on Health in San Francisco. Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at
1640 (2006).
141. See Kher, supra note 115, at 45-46 (finding that consumers would be willing to travel
abroad for medical procedures for savings ofjust $1,000).
142. See id. (finding that relatively few consumers will travel 10,000 miles for surgery for
less than $1,000 of potential savings).
143. See id. (showing that persons willing to travel increased almost 50% when economic
benefit increased).
144. See id. (presenting poll statistics regarding the willingness of people to travel for cost
savings of over $1,000 and over $5,000).
145. See id. (presenting statistics comparing consumer's willingness to travel abroad for
medical procedures based upon financial incentives).
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outsourcing and the potential impact medical outsourcing could have upon the
U.S. health care system in the future.
2. Similar Standards of Care
Another maj or catalyst for patients choosing overseas surgical procedures
is the availability of similar levels of care and expertise among treating
physicians. 46  Many international hospitals, including Bumrungrad
International, 47 have been certified under one or both of the international
quality assessments administered by the International Organization for
Standardization. 148  In fact, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations 49 has accredited over eighty foreign hospitals
through its Joint Commission International affiliate.' 50 However, since 1965,
approximately eighteen thousand organizations received accreditation from the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.' 5 ' The
accredited organizations pay the Joint Commission to maintain their
accreditation and revocation has occurred in less than 1% of all accreditations
issued.
152
An empirical comparison of quality between hospitals in the United States
and abroad is difficult due to the fact that hospitals in the United States do not
report surgical outcomes or participate in international performance
measurement systems. 153 However, average outcomes for common yet complex
operations, such as coronary bypass surgery, are likely to be very similar,
146. See Terry, supra note 111 (discussing methods to compare standards of care abroad
and within the United States).
147. See Bumrungrad International Hospital, Hospital Accreditation, http://www.
bumrungrad.com/htm/eng/main.asp?Filename= about/hospital.htm (last visited May 17, 2007)
(discussing Bumrungrad International's accreditation by Joint Commission International and
Thai Accreditation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 1639 (discussing the quality of care in foreign
hospitals and the various quality management programs adopted by hospitals abroad).
149. See id. (describing the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare as the
organization responsible for accrediting hospitals in the United States for participation in
Medicare).
150. See id. (discussing certification procedures for international hospitals).
151. See Bumrungrad Hospital Death 2006, http://www.bumrungraddeath.com (last visited
Feb. 11,2007) (discussing the history of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health care
Organizations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. See id. (questioning the validity of the methodology used by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health care Organizations when reviewing preexisting accreditations).
153. See id. (discussing the lack of statistics available for qualitative comparison of
international and domestic hospital services).
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because several international hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
International report gross mortality rates of less than 1% for such procedures.
5 4
Further, internationally trained medical graduates presently account for
approximately 25% of the 853,187 physicians in the United States, a number
that highlights the training and skill development offered at foreign medical
schools. 155
All surgical procedures carry a necessary amount of risk, however, and the
story of Joshua Goldberg's death at Bumrungrad International provides a
sobering account of the risks of medical tourism. Bumrungrad International
Hospital admitted Josh Goldberg on February 12, 2006 after he complained of
an abrasion on his left leg that resulted in pain, swelling, and loss of feeling and
motion. 156 Allegedly, Mr. Goldberg died twelve days later on February 24 after
being administered a cocktail of twenty drugs, six of which were contra-
indicated. 157  Mr. Goldberg's family contends that the hospital made no
resuscitation attempt after discovering Mr. Goldberg's body, and a report of an
independent medical examiner hired by the deceased's family supports their
allegation. 15 While Mr. Goldberg's death remains the subject of litigation both
domestically and abroad, 159 his alleged experience casts a dark pall over
medical standards abroad.
3. Alternative Medicines and Procedures
A third motivation for patients seeking medical treatment overseas may be
the availability of alternative medicines or procedures not available or banned
in the United States. Laetrile, for example, is a compound used in some
countries to treat cancer patients but has not been approved for use by the Food
and Drug Administration. 160 Laetrile contains a chemical called amygdalin,
154. See id. (comparing the relative surgical success rates of international hospitals with
domestic hospitals in the United States).
155. See G.T. McMahon, Coming to America-International Medical Graduates in the
United States, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2435, 2435-37 (2004) (discussing the influx of
international doctors into the U.S. health care system).
156. See Bumrungrad Hospital Death 2006, supra note 151 (discussing the event leading
up to Mr. Goldberg's admittance to Bumrungrad International).
157. See id. (discussing the erroneous administration of drugs leading to Mr. Goldberg's
death).
158. See id. (stating that an independent medical examiner found no physical evidence of
any attempt to revive Mr. Goldberg).
159. See id. (discussing Mr. Goldberg's family's pending lawsuits against Bumrungrad
International).
160. See The National Cancer Institute, Laetrile/Amygdalin, http://www.cancer.gov/cancer
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which is a plant compound that includes sugar and produces cyanide.' 6' The
cyanide component of amygdalin is the purported active cancer-killing
ingredient.162 Amygdalin occurs naturally in the pits of many fruits and in raw
nuts; it is also found in other plants such as lima beans, clover, and sorghum.'63
In Rutherford v. United States,164 the Tenth Circuit held that terminally ill
cancer patients wishing to undergo treatment involving laetrile do not have a
privacy right to take whichever treatment they wished regardless of whether the
Food and Drug Administration regarded the medication as "effective" or
"safe,"'165 and concluded that grandfather provisions were not applicable to
exempt the desired medication. 66 Actor Steve McQueen is one of the most
recognizable "medical tourists" to travel abroad for treatment with laetrile.
67
McQueen suffered from mesothelioma, an incurable cancer of the lungs related
topics/pdq/cam/laetrile (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (discussing the alternative cancer treatment
of laetrile) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
161. See id. (providing the chemical components active in laetrile).
162. See id. (discussing the components of amygdalin and their alleged effect in cancer
treatment).
163. See id. (discussing the natural sources of amygdalin).
164. See Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a
patient's decision to select a nonapproved treatment is within the area of governmental interest
in protecting the public health and that the grandfather provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) are
inapplicable to laetrile). In Rutherford, the United States and federal officials sought to prevent
a group of terminally-ill cancer patients from using laetrile as a treatment. See United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 544 (1979) (stating that cancer patients brought the action to prevent
the government from interfering with interstate shipments of laetrile used for their cancer
treatment). The Tenth Circuit ruled that terminally ill patients were not entitled to an exception
from Food and Drug Administration regulations. Id. at 546. The cancer patients asserted that
their choice to utilize laetrile as a alternative cancer treatment was protected as a constitutional
right to privacy and that laetrile could be approved for use without premarket testing by the
Food and Drug Administration under the grandfather clause in 21 U.S.C. § 321 (p)(1) (2006).
Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 544. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the patient's decision
whether to have a treatment is a protected right, but his selection of a particular medication is
not. Id. at 457. Rather, this decision is within the area of governmental interest in protecting
public health and the premarketing requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 355 is an exercise of
congressional authority to limit the patient's choice of medication. Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 457.
The court went on to hold that neither the 1938 grandfather provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 321 (p)(1)
nor the 1962 amendments to the statute were applicable to the use of laetrile. Rutherford, 616
F.2d at 457.
165. See Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 457 (discussing the patient's right to privacy issue
concerning the use of laetrile).
166. See id. ("In short, the record does not support a conclusion that the several conditions
in Pub. L. No. 87-781 have been met to permit the application of the grandfather exceptions.").
167. See Barron H. Lerner, McQueen 's Legacy ofLaetrile, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,2005, at




to asbestos exposure, and in 1980 he traveled to Mexico for laetrile
treatment.16  McQueen initially reported success from the treatment, but he
eventually died in November of 1980 after surgery to remove a cancerous mass
from his body.169 Although McQueen did not survive and the effectiveness of
laetrile is widely criticized by the medical community,' 70 the opportunity to try
all available treatments may spur cancer patients and others to travel abroad for
medical treatment.
The availability of alternative procedures or procedures still in clinical
trials in the United States provides another catalyst for patients seeking medical
treatment abroad. Hip resurfacing, for example, is a relatively common
procedure in Asia and Europe but is not available in the United States."'
Experts believe hip resurfacing could eventually replace approximately 20% of
hip replacement surgeries, but the approval process is cumbersome and only a
small number of medical centers are participating in clinical trials., 72 Duke
University Medical Center, for example, only performs four resurfacing
procedures a month but gets up to twenty calls a month from patients seeking
the procedure. 73 These patients are willing to pay the entire cost out of pocket;
insurance companies do not cover the procedure because it is still
"experimental," and costs can run as high as $40,000. 174 The process is widely
available abroad, however, and one patient unable to receive the procedure at
Duke recently traveled to India where the procedure cost only $5,400.1 7 The
large number of patients seeking the procedure and willing to pay for the entire
procedure undoubtedly provides a large pool of prime candidates for surgery
168. See id. (stating McQueen developed lung cancer in 1978 after years of exposure to
asbestos in racing suits and eventually traveled to Mexico for alternative treatment in 1980).
169. See id. (stating McQueen died one day after surgery to remove cancer from his
abdomen and neck).
170. See id. (discussing the medical community's response to McQueen's initial claims of
recovery and the use of laetrile generally).
171. See Jean P. Fisher, Hip Patients Find Surgeons Overseas: Delay in FDA Approval
for Hip Resurfacing Means Lost Opportunity at Duke, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr.
10, 2006, at Al (discussing hip resurfacing and the clinical trials currently underway in an
attempt to win approval by the Food and Drug Administration).
172. See id. (discussing the potential future impact of hip resurfacing as an alternative to
hip replacement surgery).
173. See id. (discussing the limitations placed on clinical centers during the trial process of
new procedures and the delay such procedure rationing causes).
174. See id. (stating insurance companies will not cover the costs of experimental
procedures still in clinical testing and providing cost estimates for the procedure at Duke
medical center).
175. See id. (comparing the cost and availability of hip resurfacing abroad and in the
United States).
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abroad. While no one motivation alone will likely cause a patient to travel
abroad for surgery, the combination of cost savings, comparable standards of
care, and availability of alternative medicine and procedures possesses the
potential to influence the health care decisions of thousands of citizens.
4. Limited Legal Protection
The dramatic price gap between surgeries abroad and domestic surgeries
stems largely from the differences in malpractice systems of foreign countries
as compared to the United States. 176 Customarily, a patient undergoing a
surgical procedure in Asia signs an agreement waiving the patient's right to sue
his surgeon for medical malpractice under certain conditions. 177 Such a waiver
permits surgeons to charge a lower rate for the surgery, because they do not
need to pay thousands of dollars for malpractice insurance. 178 Unfortunately,
the waiver also releases the surgeon from the policy goals of malpractice
insurance: deterrence of negligence, compensation, and corrective justice.
1 79
By contrasting the methods in which these policy goals are met domestically
and abroad, the risks involved with surgical procedures abroad become clear.
Theoretically, malpractice lawsuits deter surgeons from operating
carelessly by reminding them of the financial, emotional, and professional
consequences of not exercising proper care. 180 Conversely, without the threat
of malpractice litigation, surgeons presumably have less incentive to be safe in
caring for their patients. However, the few studies that attempted to model the
relationship between malpractice claims and rates of medical errors have
generated mixed results and are usually subject to methodological criticisms
regardless of the results.' 8' Therefore, there is little evidence that the
176. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text (discussing the role of medical
malpractice liability in explaining the dramatic difference in cost between domestic and
international medical procedures).
177. See Mike Adams, Rising Popularity of Medical Tourism Reveals Deterioration of
US. Healthcare System, NEWS TARGET (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.newstarget.
com/007097.html (last visited May 17, 2007) (discussing the waiver system widely used
throughout Asia to prevent medical malpractice liability) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
178. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in
malpractice insurance premiums in Asia and the United States).
179. See David M. Studdert, et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283,283
(2004) (discussing the policy goals of malpractice liability in the health care profession).
180. See id. at 286 (discussing the deterrent factor of medical malpractice liability).
181. See id. (discussing the flaws present in many of the studies conducted regarding a
correlation between malpractice liability and medical negligence).
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malpractice system effectively deters medical negligence. 82  Further, the
growth of medical outsourcing depends on the availability of consistent levels
of care; thus, some scholars have argued that this economic motivation for
future profits better serves to deter negligence than the threat of legal
recourse. 183
With respect to the policy goal of compensation, the U.S. system turns on
the idea that the party causing an injury should bear the costs of that injury,
including lost earnings, medical bills, and pain and suffering.18 4 In practice,
however, only a small portion of the dollars expended on the malpractice
system go to victims of malpractice. Administrative costs account for
approximately 60% of the money expended on the malpractice system. 185 Even
more disturbing is the estimate that only 2% of negligent injuries result in
claims and only 17% of claims involved a negligent injury. 86 Therefore, in
exchange for the opportunity to recover compensation for medical errors, all
patients pay a premium for medical care. If given the option, some patients
might elect to pay a smaller fee for health care or a lower insurance rate and
sacrifice the opportunity to recover compensatory damages. 187 Patients abroad
illustrate this option perfectly by generally paying a lower medical fee while
bearing the full costs of any medical errors. As a result, the cost of medical
errors falls almost entirely on the victims of medical errors, not the doctors
responsible for those errors. Clearly, patients seeking surgery abroad assume
the monetary risk associated with both malpractice and future complications.
182. See id. (stating that no positive correlation exists between medical malpractice liability
and the deterrence of medical negligence).
183. See Klaus, supra note 9, at 239 (arguing that the negative economic impact of
negligence on the burgeoning medical tourism industry serves as a better deterrent to negligence
than direct financial liability).
184. See Studdert, et al., supra note 179, at 285 (describing the scope of the compensatory
policy goal of medical malpractice liability in the United States).
185. See id. at 286 (questioning the actual effectiveness of malpractice suits in meeting the
purported policy goals of malpractice liability).
186. See id. (providing statistical analysis of the effectiveness of legal recourse in
compensating victims of medical malpractice).
187. In auto insurance, for example, where consumers have a choice in coverage options,
some consumers choose not to pay for optional coverage and instead bear the risk that they will
be personally liable for some damages. See N.Y. INS. DEV., 2006 CONSUMER GUIDE TO
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/auto/2006/auto06.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2007) (providing statistical data relating to optional coverage in automobile insurance) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The final policy goal of malpractice is corrective justice. 18 In the United
States, corrective justice manifests itself in large damages awards meant to
"punish" doctors for their errors. 89 Yet, surgeons in the United States carry
extensive malpractice insurance coverage, so the surgeons themselves do not
typically pay the penalty for committing a medical error out of pocket.' 90
Instead, the large premiums stemming from the malpractice insurance result in
an increase in the price of services.' 9' Corrective justice abroad is found in the
same vein as the deterrence factor; whereas a surgeon who commits an error in
the United States may be at risk of losing his insurance policy, a surgeon who
commits in error in India or Thailand may be at risk of losing foreign patients
for himself and his colleagues. Thus, assessing fines on negligent doctors in
Asia as a means of corrective justice would not advance patient safety goals.
While different factors theoretically meet the policy goals of malpractice
liability abroad, patients must be aware of the differences in available legal
recourse. The financial cushion afforded by malpractice jurisprudence in the
United States may justify to some the comparatively high cost of services. Others
may gladly give up the opportunity to recover future damages for a lower price in
the present. Such a situation swings on personal choice and undoubtedly raises
the issue of socio-economic discrimination, but such a tangent is beyond the
scope of this Note. Regardless of one's motivation for traveling abroad for
surgical procedures, the limited legal recourse available outside of the United
States is a major risk factor that each individual patient should evaluate and
weigh.
C. Standardization Attempts
The mutual benefit that medical outsourcing can provide to both patients
and insurers has led to several different attempts at standardizing medical
outsourcing as a central component of health insurance. In June 2006, David
Boucher, an assistant vice president at Blue Cross Blue Shield of South
Carolina, traveled to Bangkok to examine the facilities at Bumrungrad
International first hand. 92 Boucher stated that the HMO was "taking a serious
188. See Studdert, et al., supra note 179, at 283-84 (stating that corrective justice is a
social goal of malpractice litigation).
189. See id. at 284 (discussing the goals and scope of corrective justice as a policy element
of medical malpractice law).
190. See id. (discussing the insurance industry's effect on the goal of corrective justice).
191. See id. (stating that the premiums for doctors' malpractice insurance is passed on to
patients via the cost of services).
192. See CBS News, supra note 118 (discussing the growth of medical outsourcing as a
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look at [medical outsourcing]"' 93 as an alternative for the 1.5 million people
covered by the HMO's plan. 94 Blue Cross Blue Shield would not be the only
HMO to offer savings for patients willing to have medical procedures
performed abroad. Both Blue Shield and Health Net of California currently
offer reduced rate health insurance policies to participants willing to have
medical services performed in Mexico. 195
Small businesses are the entities most likely to take advantage of medical
outsourcing as a cost saving mechanism for health insurance plans. In fact,
United Group Programs (UGP), a Florida based company that sells self-
insurance policies to small businesses, offers a plan which lists Bunrungrad
International as its preferred provider of medical services. 196 The "mini-
medical"'197 plan offers to save employers more than 50% on major medical
expenses and reduce employees' out of pocket expenses to zero. 19' With
potential savings so high, even major corporations are investigating the
possibility of medical outsourcing. Blue Ridge Paper Products Incorporated
planned to send the first U.S. employee to India for a gall-bladder operation in
September 2006.199 Carl Garrett volunteered for Blue Ridge's pilot program
and planned to share in the company's savings,200 but Mr. Garrett's union
blocked his departure. 20 1  The United Steelworkers issued a statement
condemning Blue Ridge's plan as a "shocking new approach, 20 2 to cutting
medical costs and demanded the company offer Mr. Garrett a health care option
cost saving option in the insurance industry).
193. Id.
194. See id. (providing statistics detailing the number of plan participants whose insurance
may be affected by medical outsourcing).
195. See id. (discussing existing plans that allow patients to pay reduced premiums in
exchange for seeking health care abroad).
196. See Kher, supra note 115, at 45 (stating that United Group Providers is one of the first
insurance companies to offer medical outsourcing as a central element of a health plan).
197. Id.
198. See CBS News, supra note 118 (detailing the possible cost savings advertised by
United Group Providers for those companies utilizing medical outsourcing as an element of
their health care plans).
199. See id. (discussing Blue Ridge Paper Products's pilot program allowing employees to
seek medical treatment abroad in exchange for a share of the savings).
200. See id. (stating the incentives Blue Ridge Paper Products provided for employees
participating in the pilot program).
201. See Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan to Send Ailing Workers to India for Cheaper
Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6 (discussing the United Steelworkers's
opposition to union members seeking medical treatment abroad).
202. Id.
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in the United States. 203 Blue Ridge withdrew eligibility for the pilot plan
from Mr. Garrett and all union employees but continued to offer the option
to salaried employees. 2°
The most groundbreaking and controversial attempt to introduce
medical outsourcing on a large scale took place in the West Virginia
legislature where House Bill 4395 proposed to add financial incentives for
public employees willing to travel abroad for treatment. 20 5 Delegate Ray
Canterbury, one of the bill's sponsors, estimated it would save the state up
to $2 million annually. 20 6 The bill proposed adding the following statute to
the West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Act:
§ 5-16-28. Authorization for treatment in foreign health care facilities
accredited by the Joint Commission International (JCI); Incentives for
covered employees; rebate of savings.
(a) Not later than the first day of July, 2006, the director shall establish
a program of incentives for covered employees who elect to obtain
medical care or medical procedures in health care facilities accredited
by the Joint Commission International (JCI) ....
The incentives shall include:
(1) Waiver of all co-payments and deductible payments;
(2) Payment of cost of round trip air fares for the covered
employee and one companion;
(3) Lodging expenses in the foreign country for the
companion for the length of the treatment or procedure;
(4) Lodging expenses in the foreign country for the covered
employee and the companion for not more than seven
days of convalescence after the treatment or procedure;
203. See id. (stating that the United Steelworkers would not allow Mr. Garrett to travel
abroad for his medical procedure and insisted upon a domestic health care alternative).
204. See id. (discussing the future of the pilot program at Blue Ridge Paper Products).
205. See H.D. 4359, § 5-16-28, 77th Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2006) (proposing a system of
financial incentives for state employees willing to take part in medical outsourcing) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
206. See CBS News, supra note 118 (discussing the potential savings to the State of West
Virginia if health insurance for state employees included a medical outsourcing option).
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(5) Payment to the covered employees hiring agency for
seven days of paid sick leave which are not counted
against the employees accrued sick leave; and
(6) Rebate not more than twenty percent of the cost savings
directly to the covered employee.
(b) The director shall establish a fund within the agency for the deposit
of the remaining eighty percent cost savings. Not later than the first
day of July of each fiscal year, the director shall rebate the moneys in
the fund in equal amounts to each covered employee.
20 7
The extraordinary incentives Canterbury proposed to establish highlight the
potential cost savings available. 20 8 Delegate Canterbury's proposal is
unique even among plans utilizing medical outsourcing because it allows
plan participants to receive an aggregate of 100% of the total savings. 9
While Canterbury's plan undoubtedly will not pass-special interest groups
representing health care providers were "very distressed" by the plan2
1
0_
his proposal represents an acknowledgement that health care in the United
States has become prohibitively expensive and medical outsourcing looms
large as a potential savior to business and states alike who are buckling
under the financial pressure.
IV. Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA's Fiduciary Duty
A variety of factors serves to motivate HMO and employee welfare
plan administrators to consider integrating medical outsourcing into
employee benefit plans. 21 ' The cost savings are undoubtedly significant
and would likely lead to extended health care coverage for Americans who
currently cannot afford health care.2 12 Yet the risks are significant as
207. See H.D. 4359, § 5-16-28 (proposing the West Virginia Public Employees Insurance
Act).
208. See supra Part III.B (discussing the potential cost savings to both employers and plan
participants as a motivating factor for participating in medical outsourcing).
209. See H.D. 4359, § 5-16-28(b) (allowing a 20% cost rebate to an individual employee
and an 80% rebate to the covered employees).
210. See CBS News, supra note 118 (discussing the response Mr. Canterbury's plan
garnered among lobbyists representing health care organizations).
211. See supra Part III.B (discussing the variety of benefits available through medical
outsourcing).
212. See supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the potential cost savings associated with medical
outsourcing); see also supra Part III.C (discussing how medical outsourcing might lead to
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well.2 13 In determining whether to utilize medical outsourcing, HMO and plan
administrators must also remember their fiduciary duty under ERISA "[to]
discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to [plan] participants... and [to] defray[] reasonable expenses of
administering the plan. '214 Within this duty lies the inherent conflict between
medical outsourcing and ERISA's fiduciary duty: When a fiduciary decides to
incorporate medical outsourcing, does the cost saving element qualify the
decision as "defraying reasonable expenses" or do the risks and potential profit
to the plan preclude the decision from being in the sole interest of plan
participants? Arguments exist for both sides and this Part will explore both
possibilities.
A. Medical Outsourcing Does Not Violate ERISA's Fiduciary Duty
Three arguments exist for proponents of medical outsourcing even in light
of ERISA's fiduciary duty. First, the cost savings associated with medical
outsourcing falls within the scope of ERISA's fiduciary duty, because plan
administrators are obligated to discharge their duties for "the exclusive purpose
of... defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan., 2 15 Second, the
Supreme Court's decision in Pegram also bolsters the argument that medical
outsourcing does not violate ERISA's fiduciary duty, because medical
outsourcing may be characterized as a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision.21 6 Proponents of medical outsourcing will argue that the decision to
send a participant abroad for treatment is a mixed medical and eligibility
decision made by a physician and therefore is exempt from ERISA's coverage.
Finally, supporters will contend that the mere availability of medical
outsourcing does not violate ERISA. ERISA only imposes a fiduciary duty on
those persons who exercise discretionary control over the management of a plan
217or its assets. A plan participant who chooses medical outsourcing makes an"administrative decision" that cannot lead to an HMO or plan manager's breach
extended health care coverage).
213. See supra Part III.B (discussing the risks associated with seeking medical treatment
abroad).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
215. Id.
216. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of Pegram and its
holding).
217. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006) (defining the criteria used to determine a
person's fiduciary status under ERISA).
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of fiduciary duty; a patient's decision is independent from the management of
the plan and the disposition of its assets.
218
1. Medical Outsourcing is Within the Scope of ERISA's Fiduciary Duty
One of the major aspects of a fiduciary's duty under ERISA is to
administer the benefit plan in a manner that defrays as much expense as is
reasonably possible.21 9 Medical outsourcing presents the opportunity to cut
health care costs by up to 90%,220 thus a strong argument exists that adding
medical outsourcing as a component of a health care plan fits within the duty of
an ERISA fiduciary to defray plan expenses. In complying with the fiduciary
requirements of ERISA, administrators and fiduciaries must act "with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
221
Although this standard is more stringent than the prudent man standard found
in the common law of trusts, 222 it still provides a fair amount of discretion to
plan administrators. As long as a plan administrator acted in the sole interest of
the beneficiaries when deciding to utilize medical outsourcing in an employee
benefit plan, such a decision apparently falls within the scope of ERISA's
fiduciary duty.223 The viability of this argument depends largely on whether
Congress intended the discharge of benefits and cost containment to be equal
duties for the fiduciary or if one was to trump the other. Although ERISA's
statutory language does not state a preference for either duty, the statute does224
show a particular concern for economic considerations. Two declarations of
policy found in ERISA lend support to the importance of cost control in
managing employee benefit plans. ERISA declares, "Congress finds ... the
218. See id. (defining a fiduciary under ERISA).
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (discussing the major duties of ERISA fiduciaries).
220. See supra tbl. 1 (providing a comparison of medical procedure costs abroad and in the
United States).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b).
222. See, e.g., Rice v. Rochester Laborers' Annuity Fund, 888 F. Supp. 494,
499 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (comparing the standard of care exercised by ERISA fiduciaries to those
of a trustee at common law).
223. See supra Part II.C (discussing and defining the scope of a fiduciary's duty under
ERISA, including the duty to act in the sole interest of plan beneficiaries).
224. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (2006) (discussing the congressional findings associated with
ERISA and the goals of the statute); see also id. § 100 1b(c)(5) (presenting the containment of
premium costs as a major policy goal of ERISA).
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soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered '225 and that the policy of ERISA is "to maintain the
premium costs of such a system at a reasonable level. '226  These two
declarations of policy are central to the proposition that medical outsourcing is
a reasonable measure of complying with the fiduciary requirements of ERISA.
2. Medical Outsourcing is a Mixed Decision and Not Subject to ERISA
The second argument for allowing medical outsourcing under ERISA's
fiduciary duty requirements centers on the Supreme Court's decision in
Pegram.227 In Pegram, the Court distinguished between eligibility decisions
and treatment decisions made by fiduciaries and went on to describe a hybrid
between the two types of decision-a "mixed" treatment and eligibility
decision.228 Such decision exists when the decision between treatment and
eligibility is "inextricably mixed., 229 The Court declared such mixed decisions
to be nonfiduciary in nature.230 Decisions concerning medical outsourcing
arguably qualify as mixed decisions as well. According to Pegram, eligibility
decisions focus on a plan's coverage of a particular condition or medical
procedure, while treatment decisions center on how to go about diagnosing and
treating a patient's condition.23' The decision to utilize medical outsourcing
encompasses both eligibility and treatment. Medical outsourcing would
undoubtedly affect a plan participant's eligibility or coverage for a particular
condition or procedure, as many participants who were once ineligible would
232
be able to afford coverage which relies on medical outsourcing.
Further, medical outsourcing centers upon the means by which a health
care system treats a patient's condition. Therefore, under this analysis, medical
225. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(5).
227. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing Pegram).
228. See Pegramn v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000) (discussing and distinguishing
treatment, eligibility, and mixed decisions within the health care context).
229. See id. at 228-29 (listing examples of mixed decisions as physicians' decisions about
the use of certain diagnostic tests; seeking consultations and referrals to other doctors; and
diagnosing the emergency character of a medical condition).
230. See id. at 231 (excluding mixed treatment and eligibility decisions from fiduciary
responsibility under ERISA).
231. See id. at 228 (defining treatment decisions and eligibility decisions in a health care
context).
232. See supra Part III.B-C (discussing the significant cost savings available through
medical outsourcing and attempts by plan administrators to integrate medical outsourcing into
insurance plans to cut costs for all parties).
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outsourcing is a mixed decision to which fiduciary standards do not apply. The
Court's decision in Aetna, however, adds an interesting wrinkle to this
approach in ruling that mixed decisions still may qualify as fiduciary in nature
when made by plan administrators.233 The viability of a Pegram analogy to
support medical outsourcing therefore depends on who within a health care
program makes the decision to utilize medical outsourcing.
3. ERISA's Fiduciary Duty Requirements Apply Only to Plan
Administrators
The final argument for incorporation of medical outsourcing into
employee benefit plans without violation of ERISA requirements focuses on the
manner in which medical outsourcing is made available to plan participants.
Under ERISA, persons who exercise some control over the distribution of
benefits or assets in a health care plan are subject to fiduciary guidelines.3
Proponents of medical outsourcing will argue that both the decision to enroll in
a plan which offers medical outsourcing and to undergo surgery abroad are
ultimately decisions made by the patient. A plan participant who chooses to
expose himself or herself to medical outsourcing in any form or fashion cannot
lead to a breach of fiduciary duty by a plan fiduciary because the patient is not a
fiduciary.235 Further, offering a patient a low cost option for medical insurance
or surgery should qualify as an administrative option given to patients, not a
decision which triggers fiduciary responsibility.
236
B. Medical Outsourcing Does Violate ERISA's Fiduciary Duty
The central argument against integrating medical outsourcing into health
care plans hinges on the proposition that medical outsourcing violates the
fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA. While no single aspect of medical
outsourcing results in a de jure violation of ERISA, the combined effects of
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing a synopsis and explanation of
the Court's holding in Aetna).
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006) (defining a fiduciary under ERISA).
235. See supra Part II.B (presenting and discussing the requirements to qualify as a
fiduciary under ERISA)
236. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1999) (stating a person is an ERISA fiduciary only to the
extent the person exercises discretionary authority). Plan fiduciaries providing the option of
medical outsourcing do not possess discretionary authority, but rather pass that discretion to the
plan participant.
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medical outsourcing on plan participants amounts to a de facto violation of a
plan administrator's fiduciary duty and the policy goals of ERISA. Medical
outsourcing puts both patients and plan administrators in a unique and
dangerous position. Plan administrators and other health care fiduciaries have
the opportunity to save millions of dollars by utilizing medical outsourcing in
just a fraction of the cases plan participants present annually.237  Such
significant savings would undoubtedly affect all entities involved; plan
participants would see premiums trend downward and corporate earnings
would trend upward. There can be little doubt, however, that the majority of
savings would go to shareholders and employees of the health care system,
including the fiduciaries making medical outsourcing decisions. While ERISA
allows fiduciaries to benefit from plan decisions as long as those decisions are
in the best interest of plan participants, the strong appearance of impropriety in
such a situation is difficult to ignore.
1. Medical Outsourcing Results in a De Facto Violation of ERISA
The financial incentive for plan administrators to encourage and offer
medical outsourcing makes up the crux of medical outsourcing's ERISA
violation. Although ERISA fiduciaries may benefit from plan decisions as long
as such decisions are also in the best interest of plan participants, the potential
savings for fiduciaries who incorporate medical outsourcing are so great that it
is impossible to remove financial benefits from the decisionmaking process.
23 8
ERISA emphasizes the interest of plan participants above all other entities
when outlining the fiduciary's duties. 239 Fiduciaries who make the decision to
offer plan participants the choice of medical outsourcing merely add a layer of
decisionmaking to their fiduciary violation. Although the ultimate decision to
utilize medical outsourcing may remain with the plan participants, the decision
to offer medical outsourcing is enough to violate ERISA's fiduciary
responsibilities. Medical outsourcing proponents argue that by deferring the
ultimate decision regarding medical outsourcing to plan participants, fiduciaries
excuse themselves of any potential liability. However, in making the decision
to allow patients to choose between medical outsourcing and domestic care, the
237. See supra tbl. 1 (illustrating the dramatic financial savings possible to both plans and
plan participants through the use of medical outsourcing).
238. See id. (providing an example of the possible financial savings from medical
outsourcing); see also supra Part II.C (discussing the requirement that all plan decisions be
made in the best interest of plan participants).




large financial incentives available to the health plan undoubtedly influence the
plan administrator and result in plan participants' exposure to the dangers of
medical outsourcing. An administrator/HMO violates his duty to act "solely in
the interest" of the plan participant when he forces a participant to choose
between financial windfall for both the participant and the plan, and regulated
versus unregulated medical procedure. Regardless of who makes the final
decision, the mere act of plan administrators enables plan participants to expose
themselves to medical outsourcing due to the potential monetary savings and
therefore violates ERISA's fiduciary responsibilities.
2. Medical Outsourcing Violates ERISA 's Public Policy Goals
The plight of plan participants forced to choose between medical
outsourcing and prohibitively expensive domestic care embodies the public
policy problem medical outsourcing presents. The dramatic savings
opportunities presented by medical outsourcing would allow for many people
who could not previously afford health care to gain coverage.24° While this
result seems in line with ERISA's policy goals, the impact on middle class
America is cause for concern. The average American family of four cannot
afford health care premiums while maintaining a lifestyle based upon minimum
wage. 24' ERISA's initial declaration of purpose focuses on setting minimum
standards to allow for the equitable distribution of health care services.242 By
forcing plan participants to choose between domestic care, which may result in
financial devastation, and under-regulated care abroad, which leaves patients
without legal remedy, fiduciaries violate ERISA's goals of equitable
distribution and minimum standards of care. When a medical emergency
arises, families must choose between expensive domestic care that carries the
security of malpractice liability and medical outsourcing that provides care for a
fraction of the cost but with additional risks. The social policy argument serves
as a catalyst to the financial impropriety resulting from medical outsourcing
combining to result in a de facto violation of ERISA's fiduciary duty. While
medical outsourcing does present the opportunity for expanded health care
coverage in the United States, the financial impropriety it breeds, whether
240. See supra Part III.C (discussing current attempts to integrate medical outsourcing into
health care plans that would allow for broader and more accessible coverage through lower
premiums and overall cost).
241. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 1639 (providing statistics reflecting the
dramatic cost of health care to middle class America).
242. See supra Part II.A (discussing the scope and policy goals of ERISA).
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actual or apparent, and the irresponsible public policy it promotes far outweigh
any potential benefits. Only through careful control and regulation can medical
outsourcing become a viable alternative in American health care systems.
C. Potential Solutions
A structured integration of international care could result in health care
coverage for hundreds of thousands of currently uninsured Americans and
revolutionize the medical industry in the United States. Such integration will
require keen congressional oversight, however, to ensure the rights of plan
participants are not ignored. The high financial incentives HMO and welfare
plan managers have to increase outsourcing among participants demands
Congress regulate the practice as not to allow an abandonment of fiduciary
duties via the transfer of the decisionmaking process.
Congress should move to enact a statute similar to West Virginia's
proposed statute that would allow for medical outsourcing, yet still ensure
fiduciary responsibility. The statute should resolve two main issues
surrounding medical outsourcing: the disposition of financial benefits from
medical outsourcing and potential complications to plan participants from
foreign care. In promoting financial equality among plan participants and plan
administrators, the statute should set a predetermined percentage of savings for
each entity in the health care plan to receive. Such a division of savings
between parties would ensure that plan administrators did not attempt to
integrate medical outsourcing without providing a substantial benefit to plan
participants. Further, a statute would satisfy fiduciaries' duty to disclose-
public law would provide notice of potential savings-and law would
supersede fiduciaries in the distribution and regulation of corporate benefits.
Another portion of the financial savings available from medical
outsourcing should be set aside for continued treatment of persons utilizing
medical outsourcing. Such a plan would allow for financial savings while still
providing a safety net for any medical care needed as a result of medical
outsourcing. The scope of such a plan would ultimately be left to the
legislature to set based upon their understanding of the overall scope of ERISA
and the public policy goals of medical malpractice liability. Ideally, however,
such a fund would be available to patients who needed follow up or corrective
care in the United States after being victims of medical malpractice or
negligence during medical outsourcing. The fund would serve as internal
integration of malpractice insurance into medical outsourcing. Claims to a
medical emergency fund could dissipate after a predetermined amount of time,
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likely based upon the average recovery time or complication window in
American hospitals. Although the health of the fund might initially seem at
risk, the substantial savings and relatively low complication rate in medical
outsourcing would likely allow the fund to grow quickly and provide a safety
net to those persons choosing medical outsourcing. Congressional action to
regulate medical outsourcing could allow the U.S. health care system to reach
countless additional persons while simultaneously lowering costs and
complying with ERISA's established standards and policies.
V Conclusion
Medical outsourcing presents an interesting conundrum for both Congress
and the health care industry to struggle with in the years ahead. The benefits of
medical outsourcing, both actual and potential, are too great to be ignored, but
appear to violate the standards and protections put in place by ERISA. If
medical outsourcing continues unregulated, it will only be a matter of time
before ERISA violations create another generation of class action lawsuits.
Congress must carefully balance the risks and benefits of medical outsourcing
with the policy goals of ERISA to integrate medical outsourcing into the United
States' health care system.
ERISA sets out clear goals and standards to govern health care plan
fiduciaries. A fiduciary is to "discharge [his] duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to [plan] participants... and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan. 2 43 This duty combines with the
duty of disclosure to create the crux of the fiduciary requirements under
ERISA. Both of these standards ensure that the policy goal of ERISA, "to
protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans," are met.24  Medical outsourcing
presents a unique challenge to ERISA as it may simultaneously be in the
financial interest of both plan participants and plan administrators, but not in
the health interest of plan participants.
Medical outsourcing could provide for a vast amount of monetary savings
for both plan participants and plan administrators. In addition, the health care
options offered are generally equivalent to the services and level of quality
offered in the United States. However, the legal remedies and protections
243. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
244. 29U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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available abroad are dismal in comparison to the protections available
domestically. The difference in medical malpractice liability contributes a large
portion of the savings resulting from medical outsourcing through reduced
insurance premiums and damage awards. If the benefits available through
medical outsourcing are to become available to the U.S. health care system, the
government must regulate the practice and provide a balance that minimizes the
risk involved while maximizing the benefits provided.
The proposed West Virginia statute provides a good framework for
Congress to move towards an integration and regulation of medical outsourcing
in the U.S. health care system. The current state of medical outsourcing allows
for financial impropriety by fiduciaries that not only violates ERISA's specific
regulations, but also the general policy of the statute. Regulations that
guarantee equitable distribution of financial benefits are the first step towards
integrating medical outsourcing. Creating a fund for internal "self insurance"
by large health care plans is another key aspect of ensuring the continued
protection of a plan participant's interest while still reaping the benefits of
medical outsourcing. Congressional regulation and oversight of the risks and
benefits of medical outsourcing can solve the current ERISA violation and
provide a new future for domestic health care in the United States.
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